This is an excerpt from Neutrality After 1989: New Paths in the Post-Cold War World, edited by Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations.
Although Sweden is a small state in terms of both population, economic impact, and military powers, its foreign and security policy has always been characterized by high international ambitions and a strong desire to impact world affairs. Since the 1920s, Sweden has advocated the joining of international organizations, such as the League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations, to actively participate in, as well as influence, international relations. It has consistently maintained a strategic narrative that combines national priorities with international aspirations, particularly during times of different forms of global conflict, such as World War Two or the Cold War. During the Cold War, national priorities were guided by two key aspects. Firstly, the overarching ideology of ‘non-alignment in peace aiming at neutrality in war’ was a central pillar of Sweden’s foreign policy. This ideology sought to preserve neutrality and independence during times of conflict. Secondly, Sweden has recognized the importance of maintaining a relatively strong defense capability to defend against potential invasions. Sweden’s policy of ‘small state realism’ played a significant role in domestic politics, helping to neutralize criticism from both the political left and right (Dalsjö 2010b, 63). This policy aimed to strike a balance between maintaining neutrality and engaging in internationalism. Sweden actively participated in the United Nations, particularly on issues related to disarmament, and was vocal in criticizing major powers when they committed acts of aggression against smaller states (Bjereld 1995, 23–35).
However, words and actions did not always align. When the Swedish military archives were opened following the end of the Cold War, a substantial amount of information revealed that Sweden’s policy of neutrality had not been as strong or consistent as the Swedish people had been led to believe. Since the 1940s, Sweden had been actively preparing for extensive cooperation with NATO, especially in coordination with the Nordic NATO countries. A Danish investigation accurately described Sweden’s strategy during this period as ‘a declared non-alignment combined with close collaboration with Western countries’ (Holmström 2023, 33).
The post-Cold War era brought about significant changes and new possibilities for Sweden in the international arena. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Sweden no longer saw the need to maintain a strict policy of neutrality, and the absence of power blocs allowed for a reassessment of the Swedish position and the exploration of new security policy avenues. As a result, Swedish government officials began to describe their country as a European state, and Sweden eventually joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. Another notable change was the alteration of Sweden’s foreign policy declarations. The policy of neutrality was removed and replaced with the concept of ‘military non-alignment’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1992, 30). This shift signaled a departure from strict neutrality and a willingness to engage in military cooperation and partnerships. Consequently, Sweden joined the NATO-initiated Partnership for Peace program (PfP). PfP was designed to promote cooperation and dialogue between NATO and non-NATO countries, allowing for military collaboration and interoperability without formal membership in the alliance (Dalsjö 2010b, 68).
The post-Cold War security policy shift culminated in the first decade of the new millennium. Firstly, in the early 2000s, the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) underwent a transformation regarding defense strategy. This emphasized a transition from a traditional defense posture – focusing on repelling a potential invasion – to a more flexible defense approach centered on international missions and cooperative security efforts (Dalsjö 2010b, 66–70). Secondly, SAF transitioned from a conscription-based organization to a smaller volunteer force. This shift led to a significant reduction in the number of soldiers that could be mobilized in times of war. Despite becoming a member of the European Union in 1995, full membership in NATO appeared politically challenging during the early 2000s, with public support for NATO membership ranging from 22 to 29 percent in opinion polls between 2002 and 2013 (Bjereld and Oscarsson 2023, 8). The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 had a noticeable impact on public opinion regarding this matter. Furthermore, with a government decision in December 2014, the obligation to conduct conscript training was revived, and in January 2018, regiments began to receive conscripts after conscription training was reactivated (Löfven 2017).
Against the backdrop of Russia’s increasingly aggressive policies towards Ukraine, culminating in a full Russian invasion in 2022, Sweden shifted its security policy completely towards a focus on investing in defense against invasion and a national perspective at the expense of international engagements. After the relatively unsuccessful missions in Afghanistan and Mali, Sweden was not involved in a single major international multilateral troop operation in 2023. The new perspective was expressed in the government declaration of 2023: ‘Sweden is now changing course in its overall foreign, security, and defense policy. The government will primarily pursue a Swedish and European foreign policy’ (Billström 2023, authors’ translation). The highest priority, as emphasized by the government and a nearly unanimous Riksdag (the Parliament of Sweden), was the imminent entry into NATO, with membership being formally obtained in March 2024.
Sweden’s International Military Missions
Sweden has participated in more than 20 international missions led by either the UN, EU, or a combination of the UN/NATO since the end of the Cold War (Försvarsmakten 2023). The largest of these was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2014, during which Sweden contributed nearly 8,000 men and women in uniform. However, Sweden has a longstanding tradition as an active participant in international military missions, and its peacekeeping efforts can be traced back to 1956.
Watching a border in a blue beret: The beginnings of Swedish peacekeeping
The first peacekeeping operation of the United Nations was initiated during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It primarily focused on observer roles, patrolling, and creating buffer zones and operated under the principles outlined in Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. In the subsequent operations to come, small states like Sweden and Ireland that were not directly involved in the conflicts and not part of any military alliance often played a prominent role, as for example in the mission to Cyprus. However, the so-called Congo Crisis of 1960–1964 was the beginning of more complex missions that altered UN involvement in terms of including actual combat. The newly independent Republic of the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) experienced a period of political upheaval and violence, which resulted in a UN deployment of peacekeeping forces to maintain stability and government support. However, the situation escalated into a full-scale civil war, involving various factions, regional conflicts, and international interests. Sweden participated by sending a contingent to Congo, comprising both army and air force personnel. Over the course of the four-year mission, more than 6,000 Swedish personnel served in Congo as part of the UN peacekeeping efforts. There were 19 deaths, an unprecedented number of casualties in Swedish peacekeeping missions (Tullberg 2012). After the Swedish mission in Congo, the Swedish UN operations returned to more traditional peacekeeping tasks in Cyprus and the Middle East until the end of the Cold War (Ericson Wolke 2019, 525–532).
After the Cold War: Three missions under NATO leadership
After 1991, Sweden expanded its participation in peacekeeping and crisis management efforts around the world. Starting in the latter half of 1990s, the officially nonaligned Sweden frequently contributed to NATO-led missions. The most extensive of these were the interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
In August 1993, the Swedish government officially sanctioned the decision to contribute 800 soldiers to the United Nations, with an initial deployment to Tuzla in north-eastern Bosnia. The context for this mission was the ongoing conflict in the region, characterized by brutal ethnic cleansing carried out by Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb military forces. The primary objective of the UN deployment was to participate in operations with the goal of protecting refugees and aid convoys, establish safe zones, and to protect vulnerable communities (Ericson Wolke 2019, 532–533). Some contributing countries, such as Sweden, utilized the mandate under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This allowed for a more enforcement-oriented strategy, enabling the UN troops to use force more extensively to protect the civilian population. Initially, the operation was carried out as a rather uncoordinated UN mission (UNPROFOR) with up to 39,000 personnel from approximately 40 countries. The failure of UNPROFOR to prevent the massacre in Srebrenica, where an estimated 8,000 Muslim men and boys were systematically killed, and the escalating violence, led to a more powerful international intervention. NATO launched an extensive air bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb military positions in August and September 1995. The objective was to halt the aggression and create conditions for negotiations, which led to the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. As a result of this agreement, UNPROFOR was replaced by the Implementation Force (IFOR), which was a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force. This was the first time Swedish forces acted under the NATO flag (Ericson Wolke 2017, 533–534; Rapport från Riksdagen 2022, 30–33).
In the late 1990s, the conflict between predominantly Serb Yugoslav security forces and Kosovo-Albanian UCK guerrillas in Kosovo led to a significant humanitarian crisis. The conflict escalated into large-scale ethnic cleansing, with reports of widespread violence and expulsion of Kosovo’s Albanian population by Serbian forces. NATO launched a military campaign against Serbian positions in March 1999, and the air and missile attacks targeted both military and strategic infrastructure in the province of Kosovo and the rest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the capital city of Belgrade. Prior to the bombing campaign, in February 1999, the Swedish government approached NATO expressing Sweden’s interest in participating in an international peacekeeping force, as a continuation of the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In May, the government presented a proposition to the Swedish Parliament regarding a Swedish troop contribution in Kosovo. The tasks of the Swedish KFOR battalion, consisting of over 800 personnel (the entire KFOR force led by NATO comprised 50,000 personnel), ranged from traditional peacekeeping duties to purely military combat tasks. The specific Swedish mission was to prevent a Yugoslav attempt to retake the province by force, allowing NATO forces on the ground and in the air to keep Yugoslav forces outside Kosovo’s borders. In June 2004, the Swedish troop contribution in Kosovo was reduced and continued to decrease until its conclusion in 2014 (Ericson Wolke 535–538).
Within a month after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, American bombers began to attack Afghan territory in pursuit of al-Qaeda operatives and to overthrow the Taliban government (Sjöstedt and Noreen 2021, 324). Many Western countries, apart from non-aligned ones like Sweden, began preparations for intervention in Afghanistan as part of the US- led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). However, Sweden was later invited to participate in a British-led multinational force in Afghanistan. The mission was guided by the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1386, adopted in December 2001, establishing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the purpose of maintaining security and stability in Afghanistan. By 2003, ISAF was under NATO command. The Swedish government quickly responded by tasking its armed forces to prepare for the mission. Initially, the Swedish government proposed sending small contingents of 45 soldiers to serve within the British-led multinational force. Their main role focused on intelligence work and reconnaissance (Noreen et al 2017, 152–153).
By the end of 2004, the mission in Afghanistan underwent a radical change. The Swedish government tasked its armed forces to plan and prepare to assume command of a regional unit in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan’s second-largest city. As one of a few non-NATO members, Sweden assumed the responsibility to lead one Provincial Reconstruction Team area (PRT) – out of a total of 26 PRTs located across Afghanistan – a decision that was welcomed by NATO and other troop-contributing states. The situation in the north, where Mazar- e-Sharif is located, was relatively calm compared to the south. However, a deteriorating security situation also affected the Swedish contingent and led to the first significant personnel losses in Swedish missions since the one in Congo in the 1960s. In response to the worsening conditions and the need for a stronger presence, the newly elected government decided in 2006 to expand the Swedish contingent to a maximum of 600 soldiers per rotation, each lasting six months (Sjöstedt and Noreen 2021, 326). Starting in 2012, the Swedish military mission, along with other participating nations, was tasked with providing support and training to the Afghan security forces during a transition process. Despite these efforts, the Taliban insurgency persisted and gained strength over the years – and its forces ultimately seized control of Afghanistan in 2021 following the withdrawal of foreign troops.
From Pragmatic Neutrality to Alliance Membership
Sweden has a long-standing tradition of neutrality in international affairs, but it is important to note that Swedish neutrality has never been absolute and has held various exceptions over time. Swedish neutrality gradually emerged during the nineteenth century as a widely adopted policy for small states to avoid getting involved in the conflicts of major powers. By remaining neutral, Sweden could stay out of conflict, and instead wait for an outcome without any risk of being caught in the middle (Wahlbäck 1984).
Swedish neutrality policy takes shape
One could argue that Swedish neutrality, as it was originally established in the nineteenth century and tested during the two World Wars, by no means corresponds with principles of international law. To the contrary, it was driven by national self-interest, aiming to avoid conflict at any cost through the strategy of evading military threats. During World War One, Sweden pledged to a policy that came to favor Germany (af Malmborg 2001, 201–202). This strategy became even more evident during World War Two when Sweden reached an agreement with Germany regarding transit traffic through Sweden. In practice, this meant that the policy of neutrality was abandoned on 8 July 1940, something which was recognized by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson. After the cabinet meeting taking the decision of allowing German transit across Swedish territory, he pondered the idea that he had contributed to the abandonment of the neutrality policy. However, the message to the public was very different. Although the transit agreement meant that Sweden provided significant assistance to one of the warring parties, it was officially announced as merely a technical traffic matter. The implications for neutrality were not disclosed publicly as it was believed to have grave implications on Swedish public opinion (Dalsjö 2010a, 206–210; Johansson 1985).
The Cold War dual approach
Following the failed negotiations to form a Scandinavian defense alliance in 1949 – which resulted in Norway, Denmark, and later Iceland joining NATO – Sweden focused on developing its official policy of neutrality. Instead of isolating itself like other neutral states such as Switzerland, the ambition was rather to act as a bridge-builder between the East and the West, maintaining active diplomacy and fostering cooperation with both sides of the Cold War divide. However, while officially neutral, Sweden nevertheless pursued a confidential defense cooperation with NATO, as well as bilateral collaborations with the United States and the United Kingdom. These collaborations involved intelligence-sharing, joint military exercises, and the exchange of defense technologies. The activities were conducted discreetly, highlighting a ‘dual approach’ of maintaining active neutrality while engaging in confidential defense cooperation. This allowed the country to balance its security needs with a desire to remain independent and avoid direct entanglements in the Cold War (Holmström 2023, 22–36).
Despite the fact the proposed Scandinavian Defense Union never materialized, the idea lived on in the form of informal agreements between the defense staff of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, aiming to ensure coordinated Scandinavian actions in the event of war. They prepared joint operations, established personal contacts that could be utilized during wartime, coordinated planning, and attended each other’s war colleges. This was intensely scrutinized when archives were opened at the end of the Cold War. Researchers and journalists showed no mercy in their critique of the contradictory standards of Swedish security policy. Wilhelm Agrell, the doyen of Swedish contemporary military history, was among the first to raise concerns. In his 1991 book Den Stora Lögnen (The Great Lie, authors’ translation), Agrell highlighted what he believed to be a significant deception, or falsehood, in the official discourse of Swedish security policy.
Following Agrell’s initial findings, a public commission was established to further investigate and shed light on facts from the first decades after World War Two. The commission aimed to uncover any hidden or undisclosed information that might have impacted Swedish security policy between 1949–1969. It eventually concluded that in the 1950s, US security officials had already declared that despite Sweden not being a formal member of NATO, Europe’s defense would benefit from SAF being closely associated with, and cooperating with, its NATO neighbors and the United States. This stance was emphasized by US President Dwight Eisenhower in 1960 when he adopted the policy of assurance of US military assistance to Sweden, should it ever be attacked by the Soviet Union. The United States was also to ‘encourage other NATO countries (such as Denmark and Norway) to maintain discreet contacts with SAF as a basis for possible future active military cooperation’ (SOU 1994, 11; 13, authors’ translation). Despite the Swedish government being aware of these plans, Prime Minister Tage Erlander denied any such military collaboration when the issue was debated in the Riksdag. Such secrecy and double standards vis-à -vis the public was a recurring pattern throughout the Cold War. The unofficial cooperation continued for decades, and in the 1980s Sweden was seen by one of the American ambassadors to NATO as the ‘seventeenth member of NATO’ (Holmström 2023, 32).
After the Cold War: As close to NATO as possible
Through various covert interactions, different Swedish governments, both conservative and social democratic, laid the groundwork for a more open collaboration with NATO when the Cold War ended. A more general background for such collaborations is found in the critical changes of the geopolitical environment in Europe in the early 1990s. After the end of the Cold War
