This article is part of the US-China Dynamics series, edited by Muqtedar Khan, Jiwon Nam, and Amara Galileo.
Since the end of the Cold War, the position of the United States (US) as the existing hegemon in the international order and its relations with other hegemonic actors and rising challengers have been popular topics of debate among scholars of global politics. Various theories – i.e., hegemonic stability (Webb and Krasner, 1989; Keohane, 1980), sharing hegemony (Schweiss, 2003), and declining hegemony (Boswell, 2004; Lake, 2000) – have been developed, and their proponents have provided answers located between cooperation and conflict with respect to the US’s relations with other hegemonic actors and rising challengers (i.e., China). As a contribution to this literature, this chapter discusses the US and its potential ability to ‘share hegemony’ in the case of Donald Trump’s populist presidency, even though his administration had never shown this intention. This debate has become crucial in American politics because, at the time of this writing, Trump is the leading candidate in the Republican Party primaries for the 2024 presidential election (ABC News, 2023). Sharing hegemony might have worked better among Transatlantic powers under non-populist administrations until the mid-2010s, mainly due to common liberal values, such as democracy, individual freedom, human rights, and respect for the rule of law. However, we must also acknowledge the political and cultural differences between countries on both sides of the Atlantic, including different ideologies on how to run a national economy (while the US has a free-market capitalism blended with pro-corporate government interventions, the European countries have a social welfare capitalism with egalitarian principles) and how to contribute positively to the environment and sustainable development, as well as different understandings of human rights (such as the disparities in the legality of the death penalty both in the US and EU). But, such political and cultural differences did not necessarily deteriorate the Transatlantic partnership. Rather, they could motivate these powers to share the burden of global security (Schweiss, 2003). This could occur through a division of labor, especially in combating terrorism, where the US is more likely to use hard tools of military, security, and intelligence while Europeans are more likely to focus on the “motivating causes” of terrorism (Singer, 2003) and combine military and non-military tools for peacebuilding (Richmond et al., 2011).
Assessing the potential ability of the Trump administration to ‘share hegemony’ requires delving into the literature on how populists approach foreign policy. Although the scholarship on populism in comparative politics has advanced in recent decades, the study of populism and foreign policy still lags behind. Several approaches to the study of populism have been developed – i.e., ideational (Mudde, 2004), discursive (Laclau, 2005a; 2005b), stylistic (Moffitt, 2017), and political-strategic approaches (Weyland, 2017) – but none of them fully captures the impact of populism on foreign policy. Therefore, following Destradi, Cadier, and Plagemann (2021), I employ a pluralistic approach in which all the above-mentioned approaches complement each other to explain the relationship between populism and foreign policy. This approach helps me describe common themes of populist foreign policymaking, which were evident in the case of Trump, a populist president in the US.
Trump, like any populist president, was (and would be if re-elected) less likely to ‘share hegemony’ not only with other hegemons (i.e., European powers) but also with rising challengers like China because they make foreign policy like a bull in a china shop. Their rise to power comes along with (and is induced by) a rise in nationalism, excessive emphasis on sovereignty, and even “abrasive, narcissistic, provocative, and offensive personalities” (Nai et al., 2019, 609), which bring more instability and uncertainty into national security debates and foreign policymaking processes and creates difficulties in the division of labor necessary for sharing hegemony. Mostly because of the fact, populists are less likely to compromise (Wojczewski, 2020), engage in multilateralism over bilateralism (Biegon, 2019), diversify their foreign relations (Destradi and Plagemann, 2019), and decentralize and depersonalize their foreign policymaking (Drezner, 2019; Müller, 2016). This, in turn, leads countries (including great powers) to follow more isolationist foreign policies (i.e., Trump’s America First policy) and personalized bilateral relations and results in a general weakening of international diplomacy. Thus, ‘sharing hegemony’ will become an almost impossible task under populist leaders.
The remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I elaborate on the concept of sharing hegemony. Second, I explore various approaches to populism and describe why a pluralistic approach is essential in the study of populism and foreign policy. Third, I outline common themes in populist leaders’ foreign policymaking, as exemplified by the Trump administration, suggesting that ‘sharing hegemony’ is not a viable option for them.
Sharing Hegemony
Schweiss (2003) introduces the concept of ‘sharing hegemony’ to reconsider the roles of the US and European powers in upholding global security. Schweiss (2003, 211) aims to use this concept to enhance transatlantic relations by shifting perceptions on how to maintain long-term security in the US foreign policy establishment and encouraging concrete action in the European Union (EU) in terms of neutralizing terrorist actors and rendering them dysfunctional. During its war on terror after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US acted as a unipolar power, utilizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) limited decision-making capabilities, originating from the 1999 war in Kosovo, as a pretext to do so. Operating as a unipolar power, the US executed the initial phases of the Afghanistan war not as a NATO operation but under a US-led coalition (Schweiss, 2003, 213). However, Waltz (1979) argues that unipolarity is transient, and when a sole hegemonic power begins to act impulsively, the remaining actors in the system will unite against them. Relatedly, Gilpin (1988) and Kennedy (1989) posit that a hegemon acting as a unipolar power will ultimately fail to sustain the system it has crafted because the effort to maintain global responsibilities inevitably overextends its capacities. Furthermore, contrary to popular belief, Europeans contributed more to global security during the Afghanistan war in terms of both hard and soft power than the US, according to Daalder and Gordon (2002). European soft and hard power (e.g., French aircraft and British soldiers) engaged in combat against al-Qaeda and the Taliban and supported cave-clearing efforts in Afghanistan, as well as funded and coordinated essential reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
Moreover, the EU itself has played a role as a global security actor and carried out assignments under the ‘Petersburg Tasks,’ encompassing “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks involving combat forces in crisis management” (Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy, 2016). The ‘Petersburg Tasks’ were distinctly aimed at proactive missions or, more precisely, for conflict prevention. This represents a unique style of foreign policymaking in Europe due to its preemptive nature, particularly in efforts to prevent the emergence and establishment of terrorist ideologies and cells “through early crisis intervention and peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and state-building activities” in regions marked by widespread poverty (Schweiss, 2003, 214-215). The importance of the ‘Petersburg Tasks’ becomes apparent when considering the 2022 US National Security Strategy, which declares: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (Bush, 2002).
While the US and Europe share certain values, including respect for “democracy, individual freedom, human rights, and the Rule of Law” (Aznar et al., 2003), Schweiss (2003) highlights significant cultural differences between the powers. For example, both boast different iterations of capitalism (with the US featuring free-market capitalism complemented by pro-corporate state interventionism, while European countries mainly advocate for welfare capitalism with more egalitarian principles); they also maintain differing stances on the environment and sustainable development; divergent views on human rights – e.g., the EU has abolished the death penalty while the US has not (Zamfir, 2019); and fundamentally diverging perspectives on the acceptable tools for maintaining security and attaining peace and freedom worldwide (Schweiss, 2003). In security matters, many Europeans proudly stress their soft power, particularly their involvement in peacekeeping, crisis prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, as well as their significant aid budgets. In an interview, a senior EU official remarked that the world requires ‘smart development aid’ instead of merely smart bombs (Special Report: Facing Responsibility – Europe in the World, 2002). Schweiss (2003) argues that both the US and European powers need to acknowledge the necessity of employing both hard and soft power to safeguard and maintain global security. This argument gains credence when considering that “the general U.S. concept of how to defeat terrorism has focused on the hard tools of the military and escalated security and intelligence, while Europeans tend to prioritize examining the motivating causes” (Singer, 2003). Therefore, according to Schweiss (2003), these cultural disparities could pave the way for innovative, productive forms of cooperation in which the US and European powers share the responsibility of global security. This division of labor is necessary as it aligns with the objectives of both powers and helps overcome their respective shortcomings, especially in the fight against terrorism (Schweiss, 2003).
In the subsequent segment of this chapter, I elaborate on whether the ‘sharing hegemony’ theory and the requisite division of labor align with Trump’s populist approach to foreign policymaking. I explore this question through the lens of US relations with both other hegemonic powers, such as the EU, and emerging challengers like China.
Populist Foreign Policy
While the subject of populism has grown substantially within the realm of comparative politics, the study of populism and its impact on foreign policy remains relatively underdeveloped. Several distinct approaches have been devised to study populism – ideational, discursive, stylistic, and political-strategic – each conceptualizing populism in a different light. However, none of these approaches fully captures the way populism influences foreign policy. As a result, I adopt a pluralistic approach, integrating all the aforementioned approaches to provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between populism and foreign policy. This approach allows me to delineate common themes in populist foreign policymaking, which were evident during Trump’s tenure as a populist US president.
Like any populist leader, Trump was (and would continue to be if re-elected) less inclined to ‘share hegemony’ not just with other hegemonic powers (such as European nations) but also with ascending challengers like China, as their foreign policy approach tends to resemble a bull in a china shop. Their ascent to power entails (and is driven by) a surge in nationalism, a heightened emphasis on sovereignty, and characteristics such as being “contentious, narcissistic, provocative, and offensive” (Nai et al., 2019, 609), which spawn greater instability and uncertainty in national security conversations and the processes of foreign policy formulation, making it challenging to establish the necessary division of labor for sharing hegemony. Primarily due to these reasons, populists are less prone to compromise (Wojczewski, 2020), prefer bilateral over multilateral engagements (Biegon, 2019), diversify their foreign relations (Destradi and Plagemann, 2019), and centralize and personalize their foreign policy formulation (Drezner, 2019; Müller, 2016), driving countries (including great powers) to adopt more isolationist foreign policies like Trump’s America First strategy and personalized, bilateral interactions, leading to an overall weakening of international diplomacy. As a result, ‘sharing hegemony’ becomes an almost insurmountable task under populist leadership.
The continuation of this chapter is structured as follows. Initially, I expound on the concept of sharing hegemony. Subsequently, I explore different approaches to populism, elucidating why a pluralistic approach is crucial in understanding populism and foreign policy. Lastly, I outline common themes in the foreign policymaking of populist leaders, as exemplified by the Trump administration, indicating that ‘sharing hegemony’ is unfeasible under their leadership.
Sharing Hegemony
Schweiss (2003) introduces the notion of ‘sharing hegemony’ to reassess the responsibilities of the US and European powers in upholding global security. Schweiss (2003, 211) aims to employ this concept to enhance transatlantic relations by altering perspectives on the maintenance of long-term security within the US foreign policy establishment and encouraging concrete action within the European Union (EU) to nullify terrorist actors and disrupt their operations. During the US war on terror following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US acted as a unipolar entity, leveraging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) limited decision-making authority, derived from the 1999 Kosovo war, as a justification. Operating as a unipolar entity, the US conducted the initial phases of the Afghanistan war not as a NATO operation but rather under a US-led coalition (Schweiss, 2003, 213). Despite common perception, Europeans contributed more to global security during the Afghanistan war, utilizing both soft and hard power than the US, as per Daalder and Gordon (2002). European soft and hard power (e.g., French aircraft and British soldiers) engaged in combat against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, supported cave-clearing efforts in Afghanistan, and financed and coordinated crucial reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
Additionally, the EU has functioned as a global security actor and carried out missions under the ‘Petersburg Tasks,’ encompassing “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks involving combat forces in crisis management” (Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy, 2016). The ‘Petersburg Tasks’ were specifically geared towards proactive missions or, more precisely, conflict prevention. This represents a typical European style of foreign policy due to its preemptive nature, particularly in endeavors to prevent the onset and spread of terrorist ideologies and cells “through early crisis intervention and peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and state-building activities” in regions plagued by widespread poverty (Schweiss, 2003, 214-215). The importance of the ‘Petersburg Tasks’ is underscored when viewing the 2022 US National Security Strategy, which emphasizes: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (Bush, 2002).
While both the US and Europe share certain values, including respect for “democracy, individual freedom, human rights, and the Rule of Law” (Aznar et al., 2003), Schweiss (2003) underscores significant cultural differences between the two power centers. For example, they uphold different models of capitalism (with the US embracing free-market capitalism intertwined with pro-corporate state interventionism, while European countries predominantly champion welfare capitalism with more egalitarian principles); they possess contrasting stances on environmental issues and sustainable development; they diverge on human rights matters – e.g., the EU has abolished the death penalty whereas the US has not (Zamfir, 2019); and they hold conflicting perspectives on the acceptable tools for maintaining security and fostering world peace and freedom (Schweiss, 2003). In security realms, many Europeans take pride in their soft power, particularly their contributions to peacekeeping, crisis prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, as well as their substantial aid budgets. In one interview, a senior EU official emphasized the necessity for ‘smart development aid’ rather than smart bombs (Special Report: Facing Responsibility – Europe in the World, 2002). Schweiss (2003) argues that both sides need to acknowledge the importance of employing both hard and soft power to protect and preserve global security. This assertion gains traction especially when considering “the general U.S. concept of how to defeat terrorism has focused on the hard tools of the military and escalated security and intelligence, while Europeans tend to prioritize examining the motivating causes” (Singer, 2003). Therefore, according to Schweiss (2003), these cultural disparities could open new avenues for innovative, productive forms of cooperation between the US and European powers in sharing the responsibility of global security. This division of labor is essential as it aligns with the objectives of both powers and helps surmount their respective deficiencies, particularly in counter-terrorism efforts (Schweiss, 2003).
In the forthcoming section of this chapter, I delve into whether the theory of ‘sharing hegemony’ and the division of labor inherent in it is in sync with Trump’s populist foreign policy approach. I assess this question through the prism of US relations with both other hegemonic powers, like the EU, and emerging challengers such as China.
Populist Foreign Policy
While the study of populism has made significant strides in the domain of comparative politics, the examination of populism and its ramifications for foreign policy continues to lag behind. Various approaches have been developed to study populism – ideational, discursive, stylistic, and political-strategic – each offering a unique perspective on populism. However, none of these approaches offer a comprehensive understanding of the impact of populism on foreign policy. Hence, I adopt a pluralistic approach, integrating all the above-mentioned approaches to provide a nuanced understanding of the relationship between populism and foreign policy. This approach allows me to identify common themes in populist foreign policymaking as evidenced by the Trump administration.
Like any populist leader, Trump was (and would continue to be if re-elected) less inclined to ‘share hegemony’ with other hegemonic powers (such as European nations) and rising challengers like China due to the disruptive nature of their foreign policy approach. Their rise to power is marked by a surge in nationalism, a pronounced focus on sovereignty, and a tendency towards abrasive, provocative, and offensive behaviors, leading to greater instability and uncertainty in national security dialogues and foreign policy processes. This, in turn, poses challenges in establishing the necessary division of labor for sharing hegemony. Populist leaders like Trump are less likely to compromise, prefer bilateral over multilateral engagements, diversify their foreign relations, and centralize and personalize their foreign policy formulation. As a result, countries under populist leadership tend to adopt more isolationist foreign policies, prioritize personalized bilateral interactions, and witness a general weakening of international diplomacy, rendering ‘sharing hegemony’ an almost
