This is an excerpt from Neutrality After 1989: New Paths in the Post-Cold War World, edited by Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Vietnam’s foreign policy has gradually transformed from an ideologically-driven approach to a more interest-based one. In doing so, Hanoi has managed to overcome its isolation and deeply integrate into the international society. This integration has been achieved by normalizing relations with global and regional powers, particularly the United States and China, and actively participating in various multilateral platforms, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), with a primary focus on economic integration. Through its neutrality and flexibility in dealing with great powers, Vietnam has greatly benefited from the post-Cold War world order. It has maintained strong military ties with Russia while enjoying access to the vast export markets of the West and reaping the benefits of trade with China. As a result, Vietnam has emerged as one of the top performers in terms of economic growth over the past four decades, all the while enjoying a relatively peaceful international environment. Hanoi has also become a leader within ASEAN.
Although not formally articulated in Vietnam’s foreign policy doctrine, neutrality serves as a strategic cornerstone in Hanoi’s approach to international relations. This principle has facilitated Vietnam’s transition from a state of isolation to becoming an integrated member of the global community. Known as ‘bamboo diplomacy’ (Ngoại giao cây tre), Hanoi is lauded for its ability to ensure its own security without the need to align or ‘bandwagon’ with any major powers for a security umbrella. However, this approach is not without challenges. The increasing assertiveness of China poses one of Vietnam’s most pressing security challenges, forcing the country to make difficult policy decisions regarding potentially closer alignment with the United States. Moreover, the inability of multilateral platforms like ASEAN to effectively resolve transnational disputes has limited Hanoi’s options for achieving its foreign policy objectives without jeopardizing its neutral stance. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has strained Vietnam’s longstanding military ties with Russia, its primary armament supplier, making it more challenging to balance relations with Beijing. Like other countries in the region, Vietnam is reluctant to choose between the United States and China. Nevertheless, as competition between these great powers intensifies, the option of delaying a decision may become increasingly untenable.
This chapter aims to comprehend Vietnam’s foreign policy transition from Cold War bandwagoning to its current strategy of bamboo diplomacy. In doing so, it outlines the key characteristics of Vietnam’s neutrality, the factors influencing its foreign policy decisions, and how Hanoi navigates its strategic autonomy within the uncertain geopolitical landscape of twenty-first century Asia.
From Communism to Pragmatism: The Pillar of Vietnam’s Multi-directional Foreign Policy
Vietnam presents a fascinating case study which encapsulates the shifting dynamics of the global world order. This ranges from the post-Second World War independence movements to the intense superpower rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, then on to the peace dividend of the post-Cold War era, and finally to the contemporary resurgence of great power competition between the US and China. Over the same period, Vietnam’s foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation, beginning with its revolutionary foundations, transitioning through an ideologically-driven approach, and ultimately evolving into a framework deeply rooted in pragmatism.
Since the declaration of Vietnamese independence in 1945, extending through to its unification in 1975, Vietnam’s foreign policy was fundamentally dominated by ideology. This period, deeply rooted in the Cold War, was heavily influenced by communism, and diplomacy served primarily as a weapon in their battles for liberation, first against the French in the First Indochina War (1945–1954), and subsequently during the Vietnam War (1954–1975). As a fledgling communist state, Vietnam’s agency in its foreign policy was significantly curtailed, with the course largely charted by its larger allies – China and the Soviet Union. This reality was starkly evident in the 1954 Geneva Convention, which resulted in the partition of North and South Vietnam after France’s defeat in Dien Bien Phu. This outcome satisfied the interests of major powers like the Soviet Union, the US, and China, but left Hanoi greatly disillusioned, setting the stage for another two decades of war.
The shift in Vietnam’s foreign policy began post-1975, following the Fall of Saigon and the country’s unification. Bolstered, and perhaps overconfident, by victory, Vietnam sought greater autonomy in international relations, as evidenced when it joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1976, signalling a desire for a larger role within the communist bloc. However, conflicts, notably with the invasion of Cambodia to overthrow the Khmer Rouge in 1978 and the subsequent Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979, disrupted these aspirations. The resulting international blockade and consistent northern threats compelled Vietnam to tighten its relationship with the Soviet Union. Upon signing an alliance in 1978, Vietnam effectively became a regional satellite of the Soviet Union, often dubbed the ‘little Soviet Union’.
The end of the Cold War prompted another transformation in Vietnam’s foreign policy. Left isolated following the Soviet Union’s collapse, communist Vietnam had to rethink its strategy for survival. Initially, Hanoi sought to collaborate with Beijing in reinvigorating dwindling global communist movements. But when faced with a lukewarm response from China, which said it considered Hanoi as a comrade but not an ally, Vietnam came to the realization that to survive and prosper in the new world order, an ideological approach to foreign policy would not suffice (Tung 2021). This insight sparked a strategic reorientation in Hanoi’s foreign policy, transitioning from revolutionary communism to pragmatism (Vu 2016).
This shift manifested with the normalization of relations with former adversaries – China and the United States – in 1991 and 1995, respectively. Vietnam began participating in various international organizations, from the World Trade Organization to regional platforms such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and ASEAN. In this diplomatic era, Vietnam re-established and maintained relations across a broad spectrum, from autocratic states such as North Korea to advanced capitalist countries it once considered adversaries. This pragmatic approach allowed Vietnam to benefit significantly from the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’, boasting an economic growth rate surpassed only by China over the past four decades. Vietnam has emerged as a new Asian tiger, drawing substantial foreign direct investment from around the world.
Despite its communist roots, Vietnam’s relations with fellow communist nations such as North Korea and Cuba have been minimized, further underscoring its turn towards pragmatic foreign policy. Aside from symbolic exchanges, these countries play no significant role in Vietnam’s foreign policy calculations. For the world’s remaining communist nations – Laos and China – Hanoi’s relations are driven more by geopolitical and economic considerations than by ideology.
Vietnam has achieved success with its strategic adjustments in the post-Cold War era, effectively safeguarding its main national interests. However, the evolving geopolitical landscape in East Asia and globally, characterized by China’s ascent and increasing maritime tensions, presents fresh challenges. Particularly, incidents such as China’s 2014 deployment of an oil rig into Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the introduction of China’s self- proclaimed nine-dash line claiming 80 per cent of the South China Sea, and its aggressive land reclamation and militarization of regional waters have put Vietnam’s neutrality policy under strain. While the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) rejected China’s claims in a 2016 ruling, it could not halt Beijing’s ambitions. As security concerns gain prominence, the question of how Vietnam can maintain its ‘neutral’ stance in an increasingly polarized world comes to the fore.
Bamboo Diplomacy: Neutrality With Vietnamese Characteristics
The term ‘neutrality’ (trung láºp) is not positively viewed within the context of Vietnamese foreign policy. Official documentation never labels Vietnam asa ‘neutral state’. Instead, Vietnamese thinkers and writers – both within and outside the regime’s framework – often use the term to depict countries with inadequate defensive capabilities that rely on astute diplomatic manoeuvring for survival (e.g. Cambodia, Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden). For instance, in its coverage of the Finnish elections in 2015, the Vietnam News Agency praised Finland as a ‘small nation’ for its wisdom in not ‘aggressively rearming itself’ and maintaining a delicate balance between NATO and Russia (Vietnam News Agency 2015). Moreover, when the Russian invasion of Ukraine occurred, several state-affiliated commentators criticized Kyiv for abandoning ‘neutrality’ and moving too close to the West (Dung 2022). In this context, neutrality signifies passivity in defence policy and vulnerability amidst great power competitions.
Conversely, ‘neutrality’ can also refer to states that implement a robust pragmatic foreign policy to maximize their interests, a descriptor often applied to Thailand and Singapore, particularly during the Cold War. In both interpretations, neutrality implies pragmatism and the absence of idealism.
Hanoi, identifying itself as a socialist state, believes that foreign policy must align with the state’s political ideology. This was evident during the Cold War, as Vietnam adopted a revolutionary foreign policy, but has been challenging to implement following the collapse of the communist bloc and Vietnam’s deep integration into global society. Consequently, there is a noticeable incongruity between Hanoi’s intentions and its actions in post-Cold War foreign policy.
Despite Hanoi’s commendation of communism, its relationships with its former allies are largely symbolic. While Russia is one of the only six countries that share a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with Vietnam, their bilateral relationship – in terms of culture, trade, or investment – falls short compared to those with countries like the United States or Japan, two of Vietnam’s former democratic enemies. Moscow remains crucial for Hanoi in two strategic areas, namely oil exploration in the South China Sea and weapon supply. However, both are under considerable challenges in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Besides exchanging ceremonial greetings on special occasions, Hanoi lacks substantial economic ties with the remaining communist states of Cuba and North Korea. Its relations with the other two communist nations, China and Laos, are driven by economic and geopolitical needs rather than ideological ties. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, Vietnam’s foreign policy has increasingly prioritized national interest and pragmatism over ideology (Thayer 2018, 24). In an effort to reconcile the discrepancy between ideology and pragmatism, Vietnamese foreign policy thinkers have attempted to integrate traditional factors into the post-Cold War equation. This is apparent when examining how the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) addresses foreign policy in its political reports, which represent the country’s key grand strategy documents and guide all major policy decisions for the subsequent five years.
During the 7th Party Congress in 1991, just a few months before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus remained on Vietnam’s relationships with key communist states and on its ‘class solidarity’ with communist movements around the world (Vietnamese Communist Party 2006, 75–76). However, since then communist objectives in foreign policy have been gradually supplanted by more nationalist goals. By the time of the 12th and 13th Congresses (in 2016 and 2021 respectively), the prevailing theme in Vietnamese foreign policy had shifted towards multilateralism, respect for international law, protection of national interest and identity, and deeper integration into regional and international communities. Cooperation with other communist movements and parties is mentioned only in passing, and with a stipulation that it should be carried out ‘on the basis of national interest’.
In terms of military policy, Hanoi upholds a rigid ‘Four No’s’ policy (originally the ‘Three No’s,’ with the final point added in 2020). This policy asserts: ‘no participation in military alliances, no alignment with one country against another, no hosting of foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory or using Vietnam as a fulcrum to counteract other countries, and no use or threat of force in international relations’. These various aspects make Vietnam’s foreign policy quite similar to that of a ‘neutral’ state. However, since ‘neutrality’ is not a favoured concept, a new interpretation of Vietnam’s foreign policy is necessary.
Vietnamese foreign policy thinkers have adeptly navigated this tricky balance, maintaining ideological integrity while promoting pragmatism under the banner of ‘Ho Chi Minh thought’ (Vu Khoan 2015). Party theorists have defined Ho Chi Minh’s thought in foreign policy as an emphasis on multilateralism, strategic autonomy, and policy flexibility (Tuan 2015), traits closely aligned with ‘neutrality’. After the 12th Party Congress in 2016, the conceptualization of Vietnam’s foreign policy was developed even further, focusing on two main concepts: strategic autonomy (Tự chủ chiến lược) and ‘bamboo diplomacy’ (ngoại giao cây tre). The latter term was especially publicized after VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong used the term publicly in late 2021.
Vietnam’s interpretation of ‘bamboo diplomacy’, akin to that of Thailand’s, symbolizes its inherent flexibility and resilience. Despite the strong winds of geopolitical tension, Vietnam has managed to bend without breaking, sustaining robust military relations with Russia, opening its doors to the massive export markets of the Western world, and maintaining vital trade relationships with China. This unique approach has created a conducive environment that allowed Vietnam to emerge as one of the world’s top economic performers over the past four decades.
Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy puts a premium on multilateralism, with a special focus on regional integration. As a country that was ensnared in bloody proxy wars throughout the twentieth century, Hanoi has entirely renounced the ‘bandwagon’ strategy. Instead, it relies on a robust network of friendships and partnerships based on mutual interests (Giang 2022). A notable Vietnamese policy thinker once remarked that among the 60 countries possessing ‘significant national power’, Vietnam needs to establish sound cooperation frameworks with at least half of them in order to safeguard its interests (Tran Viet Thai 2015). As of 2024, Vietnam has established various degrees of partnerships with a multitude of countries. In hierarchical order, these include three ‘special partnerships’, seven ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’ (CSPs) – with Russia, China, India, and South Korea, the US, Australia, and Japan – eleven ‘strategic partnerships’, and twelve ‘comprehensive partnerships’. Each category defines the extent of cooperation Vietnam is willing to engage in with its partners. The ‘special’ category only refers to three countries which Hanoi had special relations during the years of the wars of independence (Laos, Cambodia, and Cuba). A comprehensive partnership typically emphasizes collaboration in non-security areas like economic cooperation, trade, and cultural exchanges. Conversely, CSPs theoretically permit a fully comprehensive approach, meaning governments at all levels can collaborate with their CSPs on a wide range of topics without any restrictions, even in sensitive areas such as intelligence-sharing or defence cooperation. In particular, the double-upgrade in bilateral ties with the US, from comprehensive partnership to CSP level in September 2023, marked a significant milestone in Vietnam’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’.
Despite some dismissals of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as inconsequential amidst the re-emergence of major power rivalry, this regional consortium retains paramount importance for Vietnam. Vietnam utilizes the ASEAN platform to voice its positions, engage with countries that share similar views, and rally international support in its efforts to counter China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. Enhanced ASEAN- led forums, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), provide venues for discussions on sensitive topics that may be too delicate for bilateral conversations.
Hanoi’s approach to multilateralism invariably involves trade. With a trade-to- GDP ratio nearing 200 per cent, Vietnam has become one of the world’s most trade-dependent economies. The country is a party to 15 free trade agreements (FTAs), including the rigorous EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA), signed in 2019, and the expansive Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), established in 2018.
Second, as a smaller state, Vietnam remains committed to international law, especially the United Nations Charter and relevant conventions. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, although Hanoi didn’t explicitly name Moscow, it implicitly criticized Russia by urging all parties to ‘respect sovereignty and independence’ as stipulated in the UN Charter. In its struggle with China’s increasing assertiveness regarding the South China Sea, Vietnam consistently advocates resolving disputes based on international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.
Third, Vietnam places significant emphasis on economic and trade relations as the primary focal point of its diplomacy. Hanoi views economic development as a less contentious issue, making it more amenable to compromise compared to other aspects of foreign policy. Consequently, Vietnam has actively pursued the signing of numerous free trade agreements (FTAs), having accumulated 19 FTAs by 2023, with three more currently under negotiation. Vietnam is regarded as one of the most trade-friendly nations globally, with a trade-to- GDP ratio of approximately 200 per cent, placing it second in Asia only to Singapore. This economic pragmatism allows Vietnam to swiftly overcome ideological differences and past grievances, leading to the United States and the European Union emerging as its primary and secondary export markets, respectively.
Fourth, Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy implies proactive engagement rather than passivity, with a specific focus on niche diplomacy where it has the capacity to exert influence, such as climate change, peacebuilding, and transnational water management (Do 2022). This proactive approach is crucial because, given its limited influence and resources, Hanoi must utilize them wisely. In doing so, Vietnam assumes the role of a middle power with a strong sense of agency. This distinguishes Vietnam’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’ from the approaches of other ‘neutral’ states. During a Centre for Strategic Studies (CSIS) speech in May 2022, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, when asked about which side Vietnam was on in the Ukrainian war, stated that Vietnam does not pick sides but stands for ‘justice’. This statement reaffirms Hanoi’s emphasis on adhering to international law, particularly the UN Charter, even though it did not explicitly criticize Russia by name.
Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy exhibits certain similarities to Thailand’s approach, but there are notable differences between the two. First, while Thailand considers itself a ‘small power that can never…make a significant impact on the system’ (Busbarat 2016, 236), resulting in a tendency to be less proactive and more reactive to geopolitical changes, Vietnam has been keen on taking diplomatic initiatives, particularly in the last decade (2014–
